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There is increasing knowledge about the functioning of accounting systems in 
organizations. The early exhortation of Hopwood (1983) for academics to gain a sound 
understanding of accounting in action is generating a vast number of contributions to 
the field (Chua, 1995; Jonsson, 1996; Preston el al., 1992). Such research has shown 
different features of the intertwining of accounting systems and their contexts. 
Remarkably, however, the unit of analysis has always been at the organizationallevel. 
Consequently, population level as a field of study has been neglected. This paper 
intends to explore how the interaction between a population and its environment 
brings about a continual process of change in management accounting systems. 
Empírical evidence supporting this paper has been gathered from a population of 
hotels located in Southern Spain. 
Organizational learning studies provide a perceptive look at the process of 
management accounting systems change. Hedberg & Jonsson (1978) found that 
information systems contain assumptions about which data are relevant, which 
characteristics of the envíronment are essential, who the decision makers are, etc. 
These implicit worldviews in information systems serve as conserving forces and 
delay organizations' adaptation to changing envíronments. Organizational learning 
establishes standard procedures that make organizational behaviour more consistent 
over time. The setup of these successful routines is reinforced through a variety of 
accounting techniques; such as reporting systems, budgeting standards, and variation 
analysis. Hence, organizations in changing envíronments should design information 
systems with built-in mechanisms to counteract the stabilizing forces that learning 
breeds (Hedberg el al., 1976). Because different organizationallevels have different 
controllogics (e.g., lower organizationallevels emphasize behavioral control), Jonsson 
& Gronlund (1988) propose that each particular organizationallevel is supported by a 
particular system. Therefore, the design of flexible management accounting systerns 
will require embodying the specific control logic into the system. In short, this 
literature asserts that management accounting systerns should attempt a reasonable 
and continual fit with their ever changing environments. 
Strategic management accounting contributions have also a potential interest for this 
papero Theoretical research has suggested that accountants might develop an active 
role in providing information for strategic decision making and for the monitoring of 
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strategies (Bromwich, 1990). This paper analyzes the information requirements of two 
economic theories. One theory stresses product features. It requires that the accountant 
ca1culates the costs of the characteristics of the goods. He or she should also develop a 
regular monitoring and reporting of these costs. The other theory is known as the 
contestable market theory. It demands that the company's cost structure be related to 
those of its present and potential competitors. Most of the empirical research has 
drawn on some of the archetypes of the strategic management literature (Miles & 
Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1973; Utterback &Abernathy, 1975; Porter, 1980) to study 
potential alternatives in management control systems among companies competing 
differently. Miller & Friesen (1982) analyzed the relationship between product 
innovation and some organizational variables, such as the use of control systems. 
These authors conc1uded that controlling for the organizational strategy becomes a 
core element when analyzing the links between control and innovation. Drawing on 
the archetypes of Prospectors and Defenders established by Miles & Snow (1978), 
Simons (1987) studied whether organizations c1assified as either archetype utilized 
different management control systems. Statistical analysis showed that management 
control systems differed among these two groups of organizations. Successful 
Prospectors stressed budget goals and an extensive use of forecast data in internal 
reports. In particular, the reporting systems of large Prospectors produced continual 
and unllorm reports subject to frequent changes in their contents. Simons conc1uded 
that Prospectors use their management control systems to screen environmental 
uncertainty. On the other hand, Defenders proved to be less active in their use of 
control systems and produced negative correlations between profit indexes and 
budgeted targets and outputs monitoring. Simons (1990, p. 127) realized that these 
studies began to provide answers to "how" management control systems differ among 
firms, but not to "why" they differ. Hence, he conducted a 2-year field study focusing 
on the management control systems features of two large companies (A and B) 
competing in the same industry. The analysis shows that interactive management 
control processes can be used to manage emergent strategies. Company A was 
c1assified as a Defender. It operated in a stable environment, and managers only 
needed to consider a narrow set of strategic uncertainties such as product 
specifications or technological innovations that could undermine current low-cost 
positions. Company B fit in with the Prospector archetype. Its interactive management 
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control systems, such as planning and budgeting, were used to discuss strategies and 
actions related to changing products or market condition uncertainties. 
Two remarkable insights can be drawn from the analysis of these contributions. First, 
management accounting systems should pursue a reasonable and continual tit with 
their ever changing environments. Second, as long as the company strategy mirrors the 
planned interaction between a company and its environment, the design of its 
management accounting systems. should aim toward fitting that strategic profile. 
Except for the case of these two similitudes with the literature, this paper places less 
emphasis on the organization as a unít of analysis, stressing instead the population 
level as the focus of the study. The unít of analysis is a constitutive element when 
examining the relationship between management accounting systems and their 
environments (Simons, 1990, p. 141). It is worth noting that the population level as an 
empirical focus has been traditionally neglected in management accounting research. 
This paper explores how a population of Spanish hotels continually changed their 
management accounting systems to fit the persevering demands of their 
environments. The period of study, 1975-1995, covers dramatic changes in the Spanish 
society (e.g., the replacement of a rnilitary dictatorship by a full-fledged democracy). It 
is argued that these developments should be taken into consideration when 
undertaking contextual research of management accounting systems in Spain. 
The chronology of transformations that the Spanish sodety underwent during those 20 
years might well be classified as follows: 
(a) TIre tral1sition to democractJ (1975-1978). In 1975, Spain was ruled by an extreme right­
wing military dictatorship headed by General Franco. Although the Franco regime 
had gradually softened its stringent initial position on human rights, the Spanish 
people still suffered coercive restrictions on rights such as non discrimination on the 
basis of gender; the right to form and join trade uníons; and freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion. 
This transition period to democracy overlapped the economic recession caused by the 
oH crisis of 1973. The recession exacerbated the already precarious Spanish economy, 
characterized. by an extreme degree of government intervention as well as by a high 
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dependence on foreign economies. Government intervention seeped into all aspects of 
economic life, in the form of stiff controls on currency exchange and imports, and 
protective tariffs on goods like bread and sugar. The reliance of the Spanish economy 
on external circumstances was due to the importance of tourism and emigrant money 
transfers as sources of income. 
(b) TIte implementation of demoeratie institutions (1979-1984). The juridical framework 
enshrined in the Constitution of 1978 made Spain a formal western democracy. 
However, many of the institutions and traditions of the 40-year dictatorship were still 
in place (e.g., the local governments were formed in accordance with the provisions 
established by the Franco regime). The subsequent pace of frene tic reforms included 
aspects such as the legalizison of divorce and trade unions. During this period, the 
economic situation worsened¡ the unemployment rate grew from 4.3% in 1973 to 16% 
in 1983. The social agents and the government, therefore, compelled themselves to 
subscribe to a series of agreements to boost the economy and employment as well as 
reduce labor conflicts. These social agreements served to reduce irnmediately the 
number of days lost due to strikes from 16.3 million in 1979 to 3.2 million in 1985. 
However, the agreements did not render any relevant impact on the economy and 
employment until the second half of the 1980s. 
(e) TIte adnptation to tIte institutions of tIte European Eeonomie CommunittJ (1985-1987). 
Spain furthered the process of structural change, especially in deregulating economic 
activity. A series of reforms including the reduction of government ownership, the 
elimination of monopolies, and the deregulation of the stock market were 
implemented. These economic reforms and the social agreements reached in the first 
half of the 1980s generated confidence among investors, making the Madrid Stock 
Exchange the most profitable one in Europe in 1986¡ its general index increased by 
108%. 
(d) TIte adnptation to tite eonditions of the European Uníon (1988-1997). The single 
European market was due to be operational in 1993. This challenge for the Spanish 
economy impelled subsequent reforms to improve its competitiveness. The 
government focused specifically on cutting the public deficit and deregulating the 
labor market. Deregulation, however, incited outright hostility among the trade 
s 
~~-----------------..,-------------~-----' 
unions, who called for a 1-day natio~l strike in December 1988. The strike was 
massively supported, signaling the start of a long period of social conflicts. 
ii 
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Studies of accounting in action represent only a small fraction of management 
accounting research in Spain (Alvarez-Dardet, 1993). Nevertheless, this sparse 
literature provides remarkable insight into the underlying reasons for management 
accounting systems change. Amat (1992) found that during the late 1970s and early 
1980s extant patterns of management accounting systems were explained by the 
concomitant social, economic, and political developments of these decades. Carmona 
& Pérez-Casanova (1993) analyzed the deterioration of organizationallearning in three 
departments of a high-tech company. The departments were involved in a long-term 
team project aimed at absorbing shop-floor uncertainty. The project ended up with a 
process of organizational "forgetting" (deterioration of learning) after a long period of 
learning and success. This deterioration was attributed to the restrictive role of the 
budgeting system in the development of innovative projects as well as the cultural 
inability of Spanish operators to raise an open discussion with their superiors about 
the underlying reasons for organizational forgetting. The analysis of this literature 
shows that both the unique changes experienced by the Spanish society during the last 
20 years as well as some idiosyncratic features of the Spanish culture cannot be 
neglected when studying the contemporary functioning of management accounting 
systems. Nonetheless, these studies assume that contextual factors dominate 
organizational life, placing less emphasis on how individual organizations can 
potentially shape their own environment. This paper attempts to show that the 
intertwining among organizations and their environments is essentially dynamic, 
resulting in a process of reciprocal and continual adaptation. 
Available accounting studies have focused on the organization as a unit of analysis 
while the population level has only produced a sparse number of marginal references 
(e.g., Dent, 1990, p. 21). Conversely, the latter level of analysis has given rise to an 
active stream of research in such areas of organization theory as population ecology. 
Hannan & Freeman (1977, 1989) assert that individual organizations seeking change 
do so with great risk. For instance, technological changes bring about the failure oí a 
large number of existing organizations (Gutiérrez & Núñez, 1996). The creation of new 
organizations bearing their new selective ieatures will become a major mechanism oi 
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orgaIÚZational change. OrgaIÚZational inertia is the converse process of orgaIÚZational 
change. The former is linked to independent variables such as age and size; that is, 
orgaIÚZations are more inert as procedures, roles, and structures become well 
established. It is noteworthy to point out that the concept of orgaIÚZational change has 
a very precise meaning for orgaIÚZational ecologists. In this regard, they make a clear­
cut distinction between structural core changes and noncore, peripheral ones. Hannan 
& Freeman (1984) provide a list otfour orgaIÚZational core characteristics (listed in 
decreasing order of importance): orgaIÚZation's mission, authority structure, 
technology, and marketing structure. Some of the empirical studies on the effects of 
organizational change on mortality support the basic tenet of the structural inertia 
theory (see Barnett & Carroll, 1995), finding that failure rates are positively correlated 
to organizational core changes. 
Hence, from the orgaIÚZational ecologist's point of view, accounting change is 
dassified in the noncore, peripheral orgaIÚZational changes domain. Contrary to the 
high risk of orgaIÚZational failure inherent in core changes, the peripheral changes 
rnight provide a longer life for the orgaIÚZation. 
Population ecology has devoted some attention to the study of the hotel industry. In 
particular, the Manhattan hotel industry from 1898 to 1990 has been thoroughly 
investigated. Baum & Mezias (1992) analyzed whether the orgaIÚZations in a 
population with similar resource requirements compete more intensely. According to 
Hannan & Freeman (1977, 1989), orgaIÚZations with identical resource requirements 
would be perfect competitors while those with distinct resource requirements do not 
compete. In short, the research question states that a greater similarity between an 
orgaIÚZation and its competitors will provoke a higher intensity of competition and a 
decrease in its survival chances. Similarity among orgaIÚZations has been attributed to 
size (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and firm generalist or specialist strategy (e.g., Carroll, 
1985). After studying the effects of localized competition on the Manhattan hotels' 
failure in terms of variations in three orgaIÚZational dimensions (size, geographic 
location, and price; Baum & Mezias 1992, p. 599) conduded that when a greater 
similarity existed between a focal hotel and its competitors with respect to these three 
organizational dimensions, a greater intensity of competition was shown. Baum ~ 
Haveman (1995) used the same database to study choice of location by hotels. They 
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found that new hotels that are most different from and most similar to their 
neighbours loca te closest to them. Likewise, they found that other hotels are located 
relatively close to similar competitors on one domain/product dimension to benefit 
from the agglomeration of economies. However, these hotels are differentiated from 
their potential competitors in other dimensions to avoid direct competition and create 
complementary differences. 
An overall conclusion that can be drawn from the organizational ecology studies is 
that the population as a unít of analysis is relevant to investiga te some of the 
consequences of organizational change. Particularly, available evidence on the hotel 
industry shows that similarity among competitors is closely linked to the intensity of 
competition and its related survival chances. In spite of these interesting insights, these 
studies neglect accounting as a matter of research. Thls might be due to the 
noninclusion of accounting changes in Hannan & Freeman's (1984) typology of 
organizational core characteristics. Although the discussion of their typology is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we should know that the sociological background of 
these authors, with scarce or null interest in accounting, could explain their implicit 
view of accounting as a rather technical and static organizational activity. 
This paper studies the process of management accounting change at the population 
leve!. Empirical evidence has been collected from a population of beach hotels located 
in Southem Spain. This population, like those of other Spanish organizations, 
experienced the turbulent environment characteristic of Spanish society from 1975 
until 1995. However, the context of change was particularly intense for the tourist 
industry, because of its dependence on intemational economic conditions. This paper 
intends to show how an analyis of the macro and task environments of the population 
provides support for a Red Queen metaphor, which is deemed to be a valid 
contribution to population ecology as a relevant context for management accounting 
theorizing. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The empirical evidence 
supporting this paper is described first. The paper then analyzes that evidence, 
introducing the Red Queen hypothesis and exploring its potential for management 
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accounting research. The final section presents concluding remarks, limitations of the 
paper, and implications for future research. 
THE HOTEL INDUSTRY IN THE RESORT AREA 
The population of hotels forms a beach resort area in Southem Spain. The weather is 
characterized by an average raÍnÍall index of 240 mm3/yr, bringing about 340 days/yr 
of sunlight. CertainIy the weather is an enticement to tourists demanding 11 sandy 
beaches and sun." But the setup of the resort area still required an intemational 
airport and a solution to the chronic water supply shortages before tourists would 
come. The airport was inaugurated in 1967 and a reliable water supply system was put 
into place in 1970. The first hotellocated in the resort area was open to receive groups 
of British, German, and Dutch guests in 1972. 
The evolution of the population of hotels might be wel1 exemplified through the 
developments of one hotel group that, for confidential reasons, we will cal1 the Maya 
Hotels Group. This group of hotels is the largest one established in the resort area and 
has played a leading role in the implementation of innovative practices at the 
population leveL This section also provides evidence on the other hotels that compose 
the population. 
The Maya Hotels Group and the Rest of the Population 
The antecedents of the hotel group are found in a travel agency that opened in the late 
1960s. It operated as liaison office between intemational tour operators and the hotels 
located in Southem Spain. Itwas founded in the late 1960s by an entrepreneur with no 
particular experience in this business, whom we will call Mr. Tomillo. The agency 
implemented a diversified strategy (Porter, 1980) in its search for a niche in a market 
with considerable entry barriers. lt, therefore, had to complete the tender usual1y 
offered by a receiving travel agency with a regular package of what were at the time 
innovative services: car rentals, visits to historie sites, and diving courses. By 1973, it 
had gained an intemational reputation among tour operators as a reliable firm with 
which to do business. 
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Mr. Tomillo soon reafu:ed that his business opportunities would expand substantially 
if he were also able to sell his own beds, rather than just serve as an intermediary 
behveen the intemational tour operators and the hotels. His finandal constraints and 
the middle-c1ass infrastructure of the resort area restricted him to entrance into the 
three-star hotel business. The First-Maya Hotel opened in 1976 having hvo distinctive 
facilities: the largest swimming pools of any of the existing European hotels in its 
category, and hvo queen-sized beds in every double room. 
At the time that the First-Maya Hotel started its operations, the Spanish tourist 
industry was already enmeshed in a recession that would last unti11983. As a result, 
the industry was extremely dependent on foreign customers. The effects of the oH 
crisis of 1973 on European economies and the high exchange rate of the Spanish 
currency (Table 1) halted the growth of the 1960s and early 1970s; the number of 
available hotel beds increased by just 1.9% during the years 1976-1980 (see Table 2). 
The overall stagnation of the industry had dramatic consequences on the resort area, 
where three hotels went bankrupt. On the other hand, the First-Maya Hotel 
implemented a policy of intensive maintenance and renovation of its premises (e.g., it 
was the first hotel in the resort area to install color 'IV sets in all rooms), aiming at 
offering a different product. It, consequently, built up a reputation of quality and low 
prices among intemational tour operators. The First-Maya Hotel drew on this 
reputation to achieve a steady room occupancy during the crisis periodo 
TABLE 1 AND 2 TO APPEAR HERE. 
Mr. Tomillo exerted a dominant influence on the managerial developments of the 
First-Maya Hotel not only because he was the owner but because of his keen insights 
into the innovative management practices undertaken by other beach hotels. He 
leamed from others that customer loyalty was c10sely tied to adult satisfaction with 
pub and restaurant services and to the overall satisfaction of the children. The First­
Maya Hotel, therefore, implemented such polides as presenting gifts to every child 
registered in the hotel and expanding the already existing breakfast buffet to inc1ude 
lunch and dinner. After 8 months, hvo other hotels established in the area followed 
Mr. Tomillo's lead and began giving gifts to their junior guests. 
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The accounting system of the First-Maya Hotel basically intended to fuIfil tax 
accounting requirements and, to a lesser extent, produce monthly cash flow 
statements. Once computerized in 1981, its goals remained unchanged; no budgets, 
performance standards, or cost figures were produced at that time. Employee 
behavior was thoroughly monitored by a large number of supervisors, whose primary 
motivation was avoiding thefts. 
By 1983, the resort area had begun its economic recovery. It was mainly fostered by 
such macro-economic factors as a weaker Spanish currency and a more confident 
elirnate on investment returns. From 1983 to 1988, the number of operating hotels 
increased from 6 to lO, boosting the number of beds 59% (see Table 3). 
TABLE 3 TO APPEAR HERE 
It was during this period that the Maya Hotels Group enlarged from one to four units, 
thus becoming a real business group. Substantial investments in hotel maintenance 
were overshadowed by the group's efforts to improve customer service. The Group 
achieved its most salient results in lunch and dinner buffet services. Overcoming its 
long-standing tradition of copying others' innovations, the Group created the so-called 
Itfourth generation'f in buffet services. The breakthrough consisted of the full 
harmonization of the buffet site in every aspect of the restaurants' interior designo This 
innovation became very popular, and came to be imitated by hotels around the world. 
The management of the group was headed by an executive board chaired by 
Mr.Tomillo and composed of a managing director, a finanee manager, a maintenanee 
manager, and one operations manager, to whom all the managers of the hotels 
reported. The Group reeruited a large number of administrative staff and eonstructed 
impressive facilities for them. Despite the improvement in administrative resources, 
however, the only change introduced into the accounting system dealt with group 
eonsolidation. 
During 1989, increased competition from newly established beach resorts in the 
Mediterranean Sea, along with a stronger exchange rate of the Spanish eurrency (see 
TabIe 1), brought to a haIt the economic growth of the population oí hotels. The Maya 
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Hotels Group had the lowest room reservation rates since 1981. To diminish the 
expected financial los ses, the Group needed to impose strict cost controls. In Spring 
1989, Mr. Tomillo asked the executive board for the calculated cost of washing one 
kilogram of restaurant uniforms. As no one could answer his question, he fired all of 
the managers and eliminated their positions. In a revamped organizational structure, 
the hotels managers reported directly to Mr. Tomillo, who appointed an information 
systerns expert as his personal advisor. 
The advisor implemented a cost accounting system that initially reported historical 
ratios on consumptions (e.g., amount of saccharin used per guest, number of garbage 
bags used per hotel, amount of electricity consumed per hotel, etc.). Based on this 
information, the new board undertook actions like the elimination of saccharin packets 
from cofee shops tables, saccharin was only served upon request to waiters. Garbage 
bags were no longer purchased; instead garbage was thrown straight from hotel 
dustbins into the municipality's bins. An analogue device automatically shut off a 
room air conditioning when the balcony's windows were open. These concrete actions 
were also implemented by other resort hotels in late 1990. 
Pursuing a higher market share, the Group implemented a new organizational 
structure characterized by three core elements: (1) Hotels became profit centers; (2) an 
incentive system for managers and middle managers was put into place and, (3) 
perhaps most important, a budgeting system was set up. Profit center budgets 
assumed that the hotel's management had to attain profit goals regardless of sales 
turnover. The incentive system echoed profit compliance as the main element in 
performance evaluation. Performance was judged satisfactorily if customers' 
evaluation reached the target of 80% of positive responses and, finally, when no 
complaints from tour operators had been received. The Maya Hotels Group achieved 
some dramatic results; the annual rate of room occupation increased from 50.5% in 
1990 to 59% in 1992 (see Table 3). 
Some decisions made by Mr. Tomillo at the time changed the composition of hotel 
owners. He sold his interest in other resort hotels to launch a cruiser and to become the 
single owner of the Maya Hotels Group. Being the sole owner of the largest group of 
hotels in the resort made Mr. Tomillo an influential person in local circles. He turned 
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III 
down offers from different political parties to run for mayor of the resort's 
municipality. He, nevertheless, encouraged the new mayor to establish a Tourist 
Management Board. The Board, formed by hotels managers and representatives from 
different public administrations, sought to define the resort's overall strategy. 
The Maya Hotels Group stressed its policy of innovation and control activities. The 
former inc1uded the creation of children' s clubs in every hotel and the introduction of 
original entertainment performances. Control activities had a twofold goal: to avoid 
thefts and to control costs. Theft elimination was a long-standing concem of the 
group' s management; at the time, it was specifically targeted to reduce theft by 
waiters. Because the cost accounting system disclosed no correspondence between 
coffee shops' consumptions and sales tumover, one waiter could conceivably keep the 
ticket of atable consumption to invoice other tables that subsequently ordered the 
same goods. The waiter, consequently, could hand over the ticket to the new 
customers while keeping the money for himself or herself. Aiming to eliminate these 
practices, the Maya Hotels Group offered one free bottle of wine in retum for tickets 
amounting to ESP 5,000. Cost control activities were guided in the main by the analysis 
of budgetary information. Such was the case with inventory reductions in the office 
supplies. These materials made an average monthly inventory of ESP 5 million. The 
group' s management decided that the central office would systematically delivered 
half of the requested office supplies from hotels. After 1 year, the average number of 
materials inventory dropped to ESP 1.5 million. Since then, the central office satisfies 
all requests. 
The management of the Group found it increasingly difficu1t to follow up the growing 
number of innovative practices. Consequently, these practices were standardized and 
compiled in a manual of procedures, which became a central element of the Group's 
organizational life. For example, participants in any organizational meeting had to 
review their manual to check if agreed decisions implied any change in the 
procedures. (Managers used to say, "The manual is our Bible".) Second, the group set 
up an electronic data system, which provided information about any detail of the 
operational and sales processes. In 1994, the system expanded to gather information 
about guest consumptions. Customers couId use any Group service through a special 
guest electronic cardo The card helped to record any relevant information on patterns 
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of consumption. Once aggregated, the system provided reports on guest consumer 
behaviour by nationality, age, time of day, etc. These reports informed marketing, 
purchasing, and personnel policies. 
Most of the innovation and control practices put into place by the Maya Hotels Group 
were then imitated by other hotels. Although the management of the Group was 
aware of this rapid dissemination of knowledge, its policy ever emphasized the 
maintenance of the pace of changes over the introduction of organizational 
mechanisros to restrict the outer transfer of innovations. However, the management 
tradition of continuosly comparing indicators of performance between individual 
hotels and the average of the group made the Group realize that competitors couId not 
imita te improvements focused on the group level. Such an example is 11children' s 
hotel"; it occupies a large part of one group's hotel and provides daily games, 
entertainment, special food, day rooros, playgrounds, etc., for guests' children. 
Another example is the "a11 included hotel"; that is, one hotel whose guests paya flat 
rate, which allows them to eat and drink as much as they wish. Group level 
innovations were, thus, unllkely to be undertaken by smaller groups of hotels. 
In short, the period 1975-1995 showed a growth of 237.9% in the resort's offer of 
hotel's beds. This increase was not uniform during that period however; it was more 
modest from 1990 until 1995 (12.8%) and stagnated since 1993 (see Table 3). Rates of 
room occupation, however, grew during the period 1990-1995, from 51.64% in 1990 to 
58.37 percent in 1995. In 1996, the population of hotels was formed by 18 units, 
offering 9,148 beds. Four hotels' groups concentrate 75.8% of the beds' offer. The Maya 
Hotels Group owns 28.06% of the available beds, followed by the Alfa-Hotels Group 
with 18.43%. As a result of the process of continuous innovation undertaken by the 
resort's hotels, the average of services offered per hotel grew from 12 services in 1983 
to 25 services in 1995. In comparison, the average number of hotel services offered in 
one of the best known Spanish beach resorts was 20 in 1995 (Femández-Revuelta, 
1996). 
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ANALYSIS 

Hotels established in the resort fulfil the geographic isolation requirement that might 
distinguish a population of organizations (McKelvey, 1982). As a result of the dynamic 
intertwinement among the population of hotels and their environments, the 
population of hotels has changed its number, as well as such salient characteristics as 
service organizations, and the accounting and control systems. The rationale for the 
continual adaptation involved by this type of mutual exchange may be explained 
through Lewis Carroll's (1872) Red Queen metaphor. The Red Queen and Alice kept 
running to stay in the same place because the giant chessboard kept moving beneath 
their feet. Then, Alice said to the Queen: 
"Well, in our COUlltnj/' said Alice, still panting a little, "you 'd generally get to 
somewlrere else -ifyou ran 'venj fast far a long time as we 've been doing." 
{lA S1010 sort of countnj!"said tIre Queell. "Noto, ¡rere, you see, it takes all tIre 
running l(Oll can do lo keep in the sanre place, ... " 
The metaphor was used by the evolutionary biologist Leigh Van Valen (1973). He 
questioned the general assumption that species that existed the longest would be the 
best adapted and hence least likely to beco me extinct. In this respect, he studied the 
extinction rates in various lineages and conc1uded that extinction is not correlated to 
age. Therefore, how welI a species has historically been adapting to its environment is 
not relevant for survival, since it can never relax; its competitors and its enemies are 
also continualIy adapting themselves to their ruches. In evolution the metaphor takes 
the form of a hypothesis, which sta tes that for an evolutionary system, continuous 
development is needed just to maintain its (relative) fitness (Heylighen & Campbell, 
1995). As Ridley (1993, p. 64) contends, the Red Queen hypothesis assumes that the 
world is competitive to the death.1 
The Red Queen hypothesis has been thoroughly tested in evoJutionary biology. For example, Gould 
(1978; quoted by Ridley, 1993) verified the functioning of the hypothesis in analyzing the exceptional 
flowering of sorne barnboos every 121 years. That flowering comes about exactly at the sarne time a11 
over the world. Then, the barnboos die. This behaviour cornpensates the overall strategy of its parasite 
organisrns; the latter develop a continuous trial-and-error process aiming toward fmding variations in 
their genes to rnake sorne progress with respect to their hosts. In this respect, the coexistence of several 
generations of hosts is rnost beneficial for parasites because their rnutations should not be so dramatic. 
Thereafter, the synchronization of the aforementioned bamboos' life cycles counteracts their parasites 
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An organizational view of the Red Queen metaphor should stress the idea that 
progress and competitive advantage are intrinsically temporary and relative, 
especially for organizations operating in changing environments. In stable 
environments, performance improvements achieved by one organization bring about a 
long-term competitive advantage. In dynamic environments, on the other hand, this 
competitive gain tends to vanish; competitors react promptly to restore their market 
position. If all members of a population are continuously involved in the creation and 
restoration of competitive advantage, the population will make an absolute fitness 
increase. However, this progress of one population will again be rendered provisional 
in relation to others involved in similar environments. ConsequentIy, the application 
of the Red Queen metaphor to a population of organizations might well distinguish its 
functioning inside population from its operation at the population leve!. 
The Red Queen in the Inner Population 
In 1989, the Red Queen started functioning in the population of hotels. Although Spain 
had made substantial changes in its political system as well as in shifting from 
economic isolation to full integration in the EEC, these changes proved to be 
insufficient for the population implementing formal management accounting and 
control systems. In fact, the integration of Spain into the EEC, rather than implying a 
business threat from international hotels' groups to hotels established in the resort, 
boosted the latter's business opportunities. Moreover, Spanish subordina tes still 
behaved according to their long-standing tradition of accepting fully orders issued by 
their superiors (Carmona & Gron1und, 1994). There was no need to replace present 
mechanisms of control. However, this situation collapsed by late 1988 and early 1989. 
Two external variables caused the resultant stagnation of the resort's econonUc 
activity. First, the exchange rate of the ESP versus the USD went down from ESP 170 in 
1985 to ESP 105 in 1989, hence, making it less convenient for international guests to 
stay at the resort's hotels. 5econd, a number of competing resort areas opened in the 
Mediterranean Sea (e.g., Tunisia, ex-Yugoslavia, and Morocco). Still a third external 
variable simultaneously changed the existing climate of industrial relations: The l-day 
strategy beca use the latter die with their hosts. Moreover, this idiosyncratic behaviour of bamboos 
prevents competition among parents and their offspring for common resources. 
16 
general strike of 1988 conveyed the message from the trade unions to the companies' 
management that conflict would replace social agreements as the instrument for 
resolving industrial relations problems. Finally, an internal variable like the larger 
number of hotels in the Group brought about monitoring difficulties, as well as 
marketing problems related to trying to seU an increasing number of beds. While the 
external variables boosted environmental uncertainty, changes in the internal variable 
reduced significantly the capacity of the Maya Hotels Group to buffer the impact of 
environmental changes on the hotels. 
The survival of the hotel group was tied to a sustained policy of differentiation, which 
materialized in a steady process of innovation in hotel services, and to the substitution 
of physical controls on employees by formal control systems to cope with uncertainty 
raised by the labor force. The implementation of these policies involved a first move 
by the Maya Hotels Group to gain a competitive advantage over the rest of the 
population. The reaction of competing hotels essentially consisted of the irnitation of 
the innovations, thereafter generating a dynarnic intertwinement inside the 
population. The Red Queen metaphor provides a suitable basis for theorizing on these 
population developments. 
An analysis of the organizations' environments rnight explain the inside functioning of 
the Red Queen metaphor. Osborn & Hunt (1974, pp. 231-234) distinguish the macro 
environment from the task environment. The macro environment is the general 
context of a specified geographical area and contains those forces recognized to have 
important influences on organizational characteristics and outputs. The macro 
environment is, thus, formed by forces such as the economy and the market, the social 
and cultural values, the political and legal situation, the technology, and the extant 
pattern of industrial relations. On the other hand, the task environment consists in the 
main of organizations with which the system under ana1ysis interacts. Customers, 
competitors, distributors, and suppliers constitute the task environment of the 
population of hotels. 
The salient feature of the macro environment of the population of hotels is its 
continuous change¡ the social, political, and econornic forces of the rnilitary 
dictatorship were initially replaced by those of a western democracy. However, these 
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new institutions still underwent two subsequent changes: first, to fulfil the 
requirements of the EEC, and second, to fully integrate Spain in the single European 
currency. The macro environment entails a similar impact on all the hotels that make 
up the population. 
The conditions of the task environment have remained fairly stable since 1989. Most of 
the sales of the resort area are made through its distributors (the tour operators) 
amounting to 95% of total guests stays. The dominance of the tour operators spreads 
over the design and implementation of hotels' activities into such areas as quality 
inspections, offer of services, and, particu1arly, price setting. Competition in the resort 
area is main1y undertaken by four hotels' groups. The largest group, the Maya Hotels 
Group, is not only the first mover in developing new services and innovative control 
practices but also in negotiating room prices with the tour operators. This negotiation, 
based on the offer of services and the existing mechanisms of control, is then extended 
to the rest of the hotels of the population. Other resort areas compete against the resort, 
although their effects on the members of the population are fairly uniformo Finally, 
customers and suppliers, the other forces of the task environment, play a secondary 
role with respecting to distributors and internal competitors. In short, the task 
environment differs among hotels' groups, depending on their capacity to negotiate 
successfully with tour operators. 
The analysis of these two environments shows some idiosyncratic characteristics 
among the different organizations. On the one hand, the Maya Hotels Group carries 
out a systematic screening of the macro environment through the regular examination 
of domestic and foreign inflation ratios, currency exchanges, expected labor uníon 
hostility, and the deregulation of the European economies2 • This analysis is then 
completed with a study of the task environment as well as the group's strengths and 
weaknesses. These analyses result in a plan of innovation and control activities. This 
group learns by doing. On the other hand, the rest of the population most1y disregard 
both the macro environment and the other competitors' analyses to concentrate on a 
thorough observation of the activities of the Maya Hotels Group. These other resort 
groups learn by irnitation. 
2 In 1994, Mr. Tomillo joined the National Tourism Steering Committee, the 1 O-member board that 
settles the Spanish tourist policy. 
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To sum up, the following sequence might summarize the internal functioning of the 
Red Queen: The Maya Hotels Group analyzes the macro environment, the position of 
other competing resorts, and its own strengths and weaknesses. Based on the 
conclusions of this analysis, the group of hotels set up a plan of innovation and control 
practices. The implementation of these practices brings the Maya Hotels Group a 
(temporary) competitive advantage·over its competitors. However, these competitors 
simuItaneousIy conduct a close scrutiny of the activities of the Maya HoteIs Group and 
promptly imitate their innovative practices to restore their market position. This 
process does not end because the Red Queen is ever at work; the imitation by others 
overlaps the next environmentaI anaIysis of the Maya HoteIs Group. Innovative 
management practices will be undertaken and then imitated by the rest of the 
popuIation. 
The Red Queen metaphor implies that all progress is relative. Market share might be a 
suitable indicator of progress because it measures the relative position of one 
organization against its competitors. TabIe 3 shows the rates of room occupation for 
the Maya Hotels Group and the entire popuIation of hotels. During the period 1990­
1995 both rates remained at similar leveIs because annuaI variations never exceeded 
1.2%. Although the Maya Hotels Group increased its rate of room occupation from 
50.5% to 58.8%, this increase was relative; the rate of the resort went from 51.64% in 
1990 to 58.37% in 1994. Despite all efforts of the Maya Hotels Group to continuousIy 
innovate, it did not improve its relative position against its local competitors. 
The functioning of the Red Queen metaphor does not assume organizations retain only 
seIective variations. An appeal to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the population of 
hotels might explain the random behaviour of the Red Queen. As we have seen aboye, 
the Maya Hotels Group introduced a guest electronic card that provided valuabIe 
managerial information. However, all utilizations of the card were not beneficia!. For 
example, the card was used to monitor the access of guests to restaurants. 
Surprisingsily, entrance to the restaurants became c10gged beca use the electronic card 
was slow to read. Moreover, in a scenario in which one hotel was sold out and all of its 
guests chose to have their meals within the hotel, it would be impossible to admit ~ll 
guests during business hours. Despite this malfunction, the electronic card still 
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momtors the access of guests to restaurants. Two reasons help to explain the 
maintenance of this particular procedure. First is the large power distance that 
characterizes Spanish culture (Carmona & Gronlund, 1995; Hofstede, 1980). Spain is 
ranked 31st among 53 countries or regions in the power distance index (PDI); its PDI is 
57 compared with 35 for Great Britain, and 18 for Denmark. Pozver distance refers to the 
dependence relationships among people in a country. In small power distance 
countries, there is limited dependerÍce oí subordina tes on bosses and a preíerence for 
consultation. In large power distance countries, there is considerable dependence oí 
subordinates on bosses. In this case, the use of the guest electromc card was suggested 
by Mr. Tomillo. His dominance as executive president and owner oí the group made it 
difficult íor subordina tes with a large power distance to question his ideas. Second is, 
the techno-culture of the Maya Hotels. Most oí the mechanisms of control are 
computerized, and assertions against an element of the control system are interpreted 
as threats to technology as a basic component of the organizational culture. The rest oí 
the population of hotels, as imitators, also retain nonselective variations as we shall 
see in due course. 
The process of dissemination of knowledge constitutes a central component in the 
operation of the Red Queen metaphor. Parker (1979) introduced the concepts of clzange 
agents and recipients into accounting research to explain differences in modern 
accounting practices among countries. He íound that international accounting íirms 
played an outstanding role in the dissemination of accounting practices during this 
century. Drawing on this íramework, Carnegie & Parker (1996) analyzed the 
sigruficant role oí the accountant William B. Yaldwin as clumge agent; he propagated 
accounting knowledge in several British colomes during the 19th century. Parker's 
proposal on cJumge agents has also proved to be useful in explaining accounting 
developments within a particular region (Boyns & Edwards, 1996). Clumge agents 
transmit ideas and techruques to recipients who íeel the need to introduce a new 
practice into their companies. In the case oí the population oí hotels, tour operators 
and personnel oí the Maya Hotels Group acted as sallent change agents. Tour operators 
are a constitutive force oí the task environment; as such, they negotiate room prices 
according to the offer of services and mechanisms oí control made by each group oí 
hotels. They start negotiating with the Maya Hotels Group. The agreement, then, 
becomes the basis oí negotiation for other groups oí hotels because tour operators 
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require them a short-term effort to equalize the arranged offer. Otherwise, they will 
face drama tic reductions in room prices andjor in the volume of customers. This 
threat to recipients force them to rapidly imitate the developments of the Maya Hotels 
Group. Likewise, recipients implement strict mechanisms of control which often 
replicate those in use in the Maya Hotels Group. The imitation of these traits of 
control is eased through the recruitment of personnel from the Maya Hotels Group. 
Personnel, thereafter, act as c1umge agents through the dissemination of their own 
knowledge as well as through the transmission of the manual of procedures. However, 
the fast process of propagation of knowledge implies that recipients do not always 
imitate efficient procedures. For instance, one group of hotels is overloaded in its 
capacity of information processing after imitating the foundations of the information 
system of the Maya Hotels Group. 
Similarity originated in the population of hotels might involve a case of 
hypercompetition. Studies of the population ecology found a positive correlation 
between intense competition and hotel similarity (Baum & Mezias, 1992); similarity 
was defined in terms of size, geographic location, and price. The population of hotels 
is fair1y similar along these three organizational dimensions. FirstIy, hotel size might 
be measured by the offer of beds; this indicator shows an average hotel size of 579.5 
beds and a standard variation of 70 beds. Second, the population of hotels is 
established along a narrow seaside corridor of 7 kms. A vailable data about the third 
dimension are not very relevant because negotiated prices with tour operators are kept 
confidential. Only face room prices are available; the average room price for the 
population of hotels is ESP 7,000, and its standard variation is ESP 1,500. Despite 
considerable similarity among hotels, competition did not peak at hypercompetition 
and its observed rates of organizational mortality¡ during the period 1990-1995, no 
hotel in the resort area went bankrupt. This result rnight be partially due to the 
existence of cooperation among the groups of hotels, as came about with the creation 
of the Tourist Management Board. Cooperation is explained by three factors: the 
isolation and specialization of the resort area; the concentration of bed's offer in four 
groups of hotels; and the medium size of the corporations that own resort hotels. 
Group of hotels are not interested in others' bankruptcy. On the one hand, their 
medium size makes impossible the acquisition of others. On the other hand, one 
group's bankruptcy, and its subsequent c10sure of hotels, would have devastating 
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effects on the resort's image. ThereEore, populations oE hotels grading high in the 
three organizational dimensions that define similarity may not be involved in 
hypercompetition¡ extremely dose geographic location, high concentration oE offer, 
and medium size oE the individuals act as constraints to the development oE more 
competitive environments. 
The Red Queen at the Population Leve!. 
The absolute progress made by the population oE hotels during the period 1990-1995 is 
rendered relative if íts outcomes are compared with the results oE other populations. 
First, the increase by 12.8% in the resort's offer oE beds Ealls below the growth by 
15.5% achieved by the overall Spanish offer (see Table 2 and 3). Secondly, although 
the number oE Eoreign guests who stayed at the resort increased by 20.9 percent, the 
population oE hotels couId not gain a higher share on the 21.5 percent growth oE 
Eoreign peopIe who visited Spain. Finally, improvements by 12.8% in the offer oE beds 
did not match the 15% increase in the number oE individuaIs who showed up in the 
popuIation oE restaurants and cafeterías (Femández-Revuelta, 1996). These data are 
reEerred to as outcomes and not to the Eunctioning oE the Red Queen metaphor. 
However, it might be inferred that the impIementation oE innovative management 
practices was not an idyosincratic characteristic oE the popuIation of hoteIs. Other 
populations of tourist organizations aIso seemed to experience the operation of the 
Red Queen. 
The Organizational Level as a Unit of Analysis. 
The interaction among management accounting systems and their changing 
environments has been analyzed by contributions oE organizational Ieaming and 
strategic management accounting. Although these theories foros on the organization 
as a unit of anaIysis, they may provide considerable insight into the supporting 
evidence oE this papero 
Organizational leaming studies have developed the concept of local information 
systems (Argyris, 1977; J<>nsson, 1996). These systems are in the main characterized by 
their focus on unique situations and real organizational processes; they are, 
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consequently, decision-making oriented. On the contrary, management information 
systems report on recurrent situations and outcomes, being suitable for control 
purposes. Local information systems have been investigated in a wide range of 
organizations; large car manufacturers (Jonsson & Gronlund, 1988), and day-care 
centres (Jonsson & Solli, 1993). A coromon feature of these research sites is their 
involvement in decentralizing decision-making power. Local information systems 
aimed toward providing information support to the lower levels of the chain of 
coromand. In sharp contrast with these research sites, the Maya Hotels Group 
undertook a process of continuous information systems change at the top management 
level; no decentralization of information support was made at any time. At the top 
management level, management information systems (e.g., the budgeting system) 
coexisted with local information systems (e.g., the operational information system). 
Evidence from this paper suggests that decentralization is not a requirement for the 
implementation of local information systems. On the other hand, local information 
systems seem to be linked to decision-making power and not to how decentralized a 
given organization is. In the case of the Maya Hotels Group, a centralized 
organization, the domain of decision making is placed on the top of the organizational 
chart and, hence, local information systems are operative on that level; as a manager 
uses to say, "1 do not want them (operators) to innova te or improvise but just follow 
the manual of procedures." This strict centralization is reinforced by the existence of 
full ownership with executive management as well as by the long tradition of business 
success. 
Evidence shown in this paper apparently contradicts the conc1usions of the strategic 
management literature, especia11y regarding the features that management control 
systems should have to fit for the organizational strategy. The Maya Hotels Group has 
the competitive characteristics of Prospectors: uncertain environment and continuous 
seeking of new product and market opportunities. Nevertheless, the organizational 
structure of the group conforms to the conditions of Defenders: centralization and 
sophisticated cost controls. A plausible explanation of this contradiction draws on 
Dent (1990). He considers that Prospectors implement strict cost controls to cope with 
task ambiguity because their environmental uncertainty is already high and 
uncontrollable. This overall argument is strengthened by the fact that the Maya Hotels 
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Group is a service organization and as such it is difficult to control the quality of the 
final service. Instead, tasks are segregated into different processes to ease their control. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Population as a unit of analysis núght become a fruitful focus of study in accounting 
research. Accounting change (or its obverse, inertia) could be well understood through 
an analysis at the population leve!. This paper shows how a population of beach hotels 
has continually changed its management accounting systems. The process of 
accounting change is explained through the functioning of a Red Queen metaphor; in 
cases of Herce competition, the metaphor sta tes that progress and competitive 
advantage are intrinsically relative and temporary. This paper provides some 
measures of progress inside the population of hotels and among populations. The 
population of beach hotels is formed by a first mover and its followers. The first mover 
undertakes an analysis of its macro and task environments that brings about the 
functioning of the Red Queen; drawing on these analyses, it implements innovative 
management practices which generate a short-term competitive gain. However, these 
practices are rapidly dissenúnated by c1zange agellts among redpients. The subsequent 
inútation of the new practices by redpiellts restores the market situation. The first 
mover, again, screens its environments in its search for control and service 
opportunities, and so on. Practlces retained by the population of hotels, however, do 
not always have selective traits but may also have neutral and negative ones. These 
maUunctions could be due to the rapid process of dissemination of innovation as well 
as to the ownership structure and large power distance that characterizes Spanish 
culture. Management accounting systems play a significant role in the search by the 
first mover for new services and control mechanisms, hence, partially shaping their 
task environment through the subsequent dissemination of their knowledge. 
Conversely, imitators first implement new services and then adapt their control 
systems. 
Supporting evidence of this paper núght also be analyzed through theories that focus 
on the organization as a unit of analysis. Organizatlonallearning literature links local 
information systems to processes of organizational decentralizatlon; this paper 
suggests that local information systems could also operate in centralized 
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organizations, especialIy those serving decisíon-making purposes. Likewise, this paper 
found that a Prospector strategy may be coherent with centralized organizations and 
strict cost controls because of the Prospector' s need to absorb uncertainty at the task 
environment level; this need is judged to be more intense in service organizations 
operating in competitive markets. 
The Spanish society underwent tumultous changes during the period 1975-1995. 
Conc1usions of this paper suggest that Spanish organizations couId not automatically 
respond to the developments in their macro environment with irnmediate changes in 
their management control systems (see Amat et al, 1994). On the other hand, it could be 
the combination of sorne concrete alterations in the macro and task environments of 
organizations what provoked changes in their management accounting systems. 
Although conc1usions of this paper might be generalized back to sustaining theories, 
generalization to other situations is hardly possible because the paper only refers to a 
population of beach hotels (Lukka & Kasanen, 1995). Population as a field of study 
has sorne potential for management accounting research. This approach couId provide 
a sound understanding of cases of accounting inertia such as the nonimpIementation 
of ABe systems by large consuItancy companies. Likewise, research on cases of 
accounting change at the population leveI couId cover more compIex situations than 
those analyzed in this paper: Environments featured by several first movers; cases of 
hypercompetition; and a more active role of c1umge agents like consultancy firms in the 
impIementation of innovative practices could be environments of possible interest for 
accounting researchers. 
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TABLE 1 
Exchange rate of ESp·USD 
Year Exchange rate 
1976 66,9 
1980 71,7 
1985 170,0 
1989 105,5 
1990 101,9 
1995 124,7 
Source: Banco de Espaiia 
TABLEl 

Tbe touríst industry in Spain (1976-1995) 

1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Foreign visitors 
Amount 30,014,187 38,026,816 43,235,000 52,044,100 63,255,000 
Index 
(1990:100) 57.67 73.06 83.07 100.00 121.54 
Hotel beds 
Amount 798,985 814,394 843,337 929,533 1,074,017 
lndex 
(1990:\00) 85.95 87.6\ 90.72 100.00 1\5.54 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) and Ministry of Commerce and Tourism. 
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TABLE3 
The tourist industry in the resort area (1990-1995) 
Foreign 
visitors 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Amount 
Index 
(1990:100) 
Hotel beds 
175,176 
100.00 
174,498 
99.61 
193,517 
110.47 
209,812 
119.77 
211,484 
120.72 
211,874 
120.94 
Amount 
Index 
(1990: 100) 
Ratesol 
room 
occupation 
(resort) 
Rates 01 
room 
occupation 
(Maya 
Hote/s) 
8,107 
100.00 
51.64 
50.52 
8,490 
104,72 
52.23 
53.00 
8,910 
109.90 
58.64 
59.00 
9,093 
112.16 
62.09 
61.50 
9,093 
112.16 
61.88 
58.75 
9,148 
112.84 
58.37 
58.80 
Source: Fernández-Revuelta (1996) and own elaboration. 
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